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11 Introduction
Since their introduction in 1985, the interactive proof systems of Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff [GMR89]
and Arthur–Merlin games of Babai [BM88] have played a central role in complexity theory and cryptog-
raphy. A surprising result of Goldwasser and Sipser [GS89] shows that these two important models are
actually equivalent in expressive power. That is, every interactive proof system can be transformed into
an Arthur–Merlin game (which is an interactive proof in which the veriﬁer’s messages consist solely of
random coin ﬂips). Although this result played an important role in subsequent theoretical work (cf.,
[FGM
+89, BHZ87, IY87, BGG
+88]), its applicability to cryptographic protocols is limited because the
transformation does not preserve the complexity of the prover. In this paper, we demonstrate that this de-
ﬁciency is inherent. We do this by showing that a wide class of transformations cannot transform general
interactive proofs into public-coin ones (i.e., Arthur-Merlin games) without increasing the prover’s com-
plexity.
Interactive Proofs. Informally, an interactive proof [GMR89] for a decision problem
￿ is an interactive
protocol
(
 
 
 
) by which a computationally unbounded prover
  tries to convince a polynomial-time ver-
iﬁer
  that some string
  is a YES instance of
￿.1 Each of the two parties can privately ﬂip coins, and
exchange messages in polynomially many rounds of interactions, after which
  either accepts or rejects.
The deﬁnition requires:
1. (Completeness) If
  is a YES instance, then
  will accept with high probability after interacting with
 .
2. (Soundness) If
  is a NO instance, then
  will reject with high probability after interacting with any
strategy
 
￿.
A public-coin interactive proof system (or Arthur–Merlin game) [BM88] is one in which the verifer’s mes-
sages at each round of interaction consist solely of random coin ﬂips.
Intuitively, it seems that general interactive proofs should be much more powerful than public-coin
ones. Indeed, several examples of interactive proofs, most notably the GRAPH NONISOMORPHISM proof
system of [GMW91], appear to use private coins in an essential way. However, this intuition is incorrect, as
Goldwasser and Sipser [GS89] demonstrated by giving a general method to transform any interactive proof
into a public-coin one.
From both a theoretical and practical point of view, it is important to compare the complexity of the
interactive proof systems produced by the Goldwasser–Sipser transformation with that of the original proof
system. In some complexity measures, the transformation is very efﬁcient. For example, it increases the
round complexity of the proof system by only an additive constant. However, the transformation does not
preserve the computational complexity of the prover strategy. For example, even if the original prover
could be implemented in polynomial time given some auxiliary information (as is typically the case in
cryptographic applications), the resulting prover is not guaranteed to have this property. We prove that this
is inherent in the techniques used.
Black-box transformations. To obtain our negative result, we follow the approach pioneered by Impagli-
azzo and Rudich [IR89], and focus on a characteristic shared by most known transformations of interactive
proof systems, including the one of Goldwasser and Sipser. Speciﬁcally, these transformations only use
the original prover and veriﬁer strategies as “black boxes”. That is, the new protocol only exploits the
1We allow
  to be a promise problem [ESY84], rather than just a language. Formally, a promise problem
 
 
 
 
 
;
 
 
  is a
pair of disjoint sets of strings, referred to as YES and NO instances, respectively.
1input-output behavior of these strategies, rather than the particular algorithms used to compute them. More
precisely, if
(
 
 
 
) is the original interactive proof and
(
 
0
 
 
0
) is the new interactive proof, then
1. The strategy of
 
0 on input
  can be computed by a polynomial-time algorithm given oracle access to
the strategy of
  on input
 .
2. The strategy of
 
0 on input
  can be computed by a (not necessarily efﬁcient) algorithm given oracle
access to the strategies of
  and
  on input
 .
Here, by the strategy of a party
 
 
 
 
 
 
  on input
 , we mean the function
 
x which takes
 ’s random
coins and the history of messages exchanged and outputs
 ’s next message. We call a transformation
(
 
 
 
)
 
 
(
 
0
 
 
0
) satisfying the above two properties a black-box transformation. Note that the algorithms
used to compute
 
0 and
 
0 do not even explicitly look at the input
 ; the role played by the input is limited
to its effect on the strategies of
  and
  (i.e., the input to
 
0 and
 
0 is just the length of
  in unary). We
say that a black-box transformation preserves the prover’s complexity if the strategy of
 
0 on input
  can in
fact be computed in polynomial time given oracle access to the strategies
  and
  on input
 .
With these deﬁnitions, we can state our main result:
Theorem 1 If one-way functions exist, then there is no black-box transformation from private-coin interac-
tive proofs to public-coin ones that preserves the prover’s complexity.
A natural question is whether “current techniques” are actually limited to black-box transformations.
First, we note that, in addition to the Goldwasser–Sipser transformation, most other general tranforma-
tions of interactive proofs are also black-box transformations. Examples include the Collapse Theorem
of Babai and Moran [BM88], the transformation of [FGM
+89] from interactive proofs to ones with per-
fect completeness, and transformations of honest-veriﬁer zero-knowledge proofs to general zero-knowledge
proofs [BMO90, OVY93, DGOW95, GSV98]. The only exceptions we know of are those that exploit
complete problems, such as [GMW91, BGKW88, LFKN92, Sha92], and typically this approach increases
complexity “to the maximum.” For example, another way to prove that every problem possessing an inter-
active proof also has a public-coin interactive proof would be to combine the inclusion
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
with the direct public-coin interactive proof for the
 
 
 
 
 
 -complete problem QUANTIFIED BOOLEAN
FORMULA [LFKN92, Sha92]. This approach necessarily yields interactive proofs whose complexity is that
of QUANTIFIED BOOLEAN FORMULA, regardless of the complexity of the original interactive proof.
Zero-knowledge proofs. Thecryptographic interest ininteractive proofs focuses primarily onzero-knowledge
proofs [GMR89], which can be informally described as interactive proofs in which the veriﬁer learns nothing
from the interaction other than the fact that the assertion being proven is true. This property is formalized by
requiring that there is an efﬁcient algorithm, called a simulator, whose output distribution (on YES instances)
is “similar” to the veriﬁer’s view of the interaction. Intuitively, this means that the veriﬁer learns nothing
since it could run the simulator instead of interacting with the prover.
There are several choices in the deﬁnition of zero-knowledge proofs that give rise to notions of varying
strength. Regarding the quality of simulation, there are three common interpretations of “similarity” for
probability distributions, which lead to the notions of perfect zero knowledge, statistical zero knowledge,
and computatational zero knowledge. Another choice is whether we should only require that the veriﬁer
learns nothing if it follows the speciﬁed protocol, or whether we should demand the same for cheating
veriﬁer strategies that can deviate arbitrarily from the speciﬁed protocol. The former is known as honest-
veriﬁer zero knowledge, whereas the latter is often called general zero knowledge.
The Goldwasser–Sipser transformation does not preserve any sort of zero knowledge property. This was
remedied by Okamoto [Oka96], who showed how to transform “honest-veriﬁer statistical zero-knowledge
2proofs” into ones which use only public coins. Okamoto’s transformation provided a crucial starting point
for a number of subsequent works on statistical zero knowledge (cf., [SV97, GSV98, Vad99]). Like the
Goldwasser–Sipser transformation, neither Okamoto’s transformation nor its later simpliﬁcations [GV99,
Vad99] preserve the complexity of the prover.
The statement of Theorem 1 does not immediately apply to the zero knowledge setting, because the
transformations of zero-knowledge proofs mentioned above use black-box access to the simulator in addi-
tion to the prover and veriﬁer. However, our proof gives something much stronger than what is stated in
Theorem 1, and does imply an analogous result for transforming zero-knowledge proofs.
Theorem 2 (Thm. 1, strengthened) Assume one-way functions exist. Then there is no black-box transfor-
mation from honest-veriﬁer perfect zero-knowledge proof systems topublic-coin proof systems that preserves
the prover’s complexity, even if the new prover and veriﬁer are also allowed black-box access to the simula-
tor for the original proof system.
In fact, we exhibit a speciﬁc problem and honest-veriﬁer perfect zero-knowledge proof on which any
such transformation must fail. The problem is called DISJOINT SUPPORT, and is a restriction of STATISTI-
CAL DIFFERENCE, the complete problem for statistical zero knowledge given in [SV97].
Unconditional results. The assumption that one-way functions exist can be removed from both Theo-
rems 1 and 2 if we augment the deﬁnition of black-box transformation with another property satisﬁed by all
the black-box transformations we have mentioned. Namely, the transformations in [GS89, Oka96, GV99,
Vad99] all work even when the original veriﬁer is not polynomial time. Clearly, in such a situation we cannot
hope for the new veriﬁer to run in polynomial time. But it is still meaningful to require that the new veriﬁer
runs in polynomial time when given oracle access to the original veriﬁer’s strategy on a given input, and that
completeness and soundness are preserved on an input-by-input basis. We call black-box transformation
that satisﬁes this property a strong black-box transformation. We can prove analogues of Theorems 1 and 2
for strong black-box transformations without any computational assumption.
Perfect completeness. An interactive proof system is said to have perfect completeness if the veriﬁer ac-
cepts with probability 1 when interacting with the prover on YES instances. F¨ urer et al. [FGM
+89] showed
that every interactive proof can be transformed into one with perfect completeness. Their transformation
does not preserve the prover’s complexity. We show that this is inherent in the fact that their construction is
a strong black-box transformation.
Proposition 3 There is no strong black-box transformation of general interactive proofs into ones with
perfect completeness that preserves that prover’s complexity.
The restriction to strong black-box transformations is important in our proof of Proposition 3. In fact,
recent results on derandomization give (non-strong) black-box transformations in cases where we have ruled
out strong black-box transformations. We discuss this connection with derandomization in more detail in
Section 5.
Additional Related Work. Kilian [Kil90] introduced the terminology “robust transformations” for trans-
formations of interactive proof systems that preserve the complexity of the prover, and gave a ﬁrst step
towards achieving a robust transformation from interactive proofs to zero-knowledge proofs. The deﬁni-
tion of a robust transformation does not require that the original veriﬁer strategy be accessed only as a
black box. The complexity of the prover in interactive proofs was previously studied by Bellare and Gold-
wasser [BG94]. They showed that, under a complexity-theoretic assumption, there is a problem
￿ in
 
 
3which is harder to prove than it is to decide; that is, no interactive proof for
￿ has a prover which can be
implemented in polynomial time given an oracle for deciding
￿.
2 The main result
Our proof of Theorem 2 is based on analyzing the effect of a black-box transformation on a proof system for
a problem called DISJOINT SUPPORT. The deﬁnition of DISJOINT SUPPORT involves probability distribu-
tions encoded by circuits which sample from them. More precisely, if
  is a Boolean circuit with
  input
gates and
  output gates, the probability distribution encoded by
  is the distribution on
 
0
 
1
 
n induced
by feeding
  the uniform distribution on
 
0
 
1
 
m and taking the output. For notational convenience, we
also denote this probability distribution by
 . We write
 
 
  to indicate that the probability distributions
encoded by circuits
  and
  are identical. The support of probability distribution
  on a universe
  is the
set
S
u
p
p
(
 
)
 
  of points which are assigned nonzero probability mass under
 .
Deﬁnition 4 DISJOINT SUPPORT (DS) is the promise problem DS
=
(DS
Y
 DS
N
) given by:
DS
Y
=
 
(
 
 
 
)
:
S
u
p
p
(
 
)
 
S
u
p
p
(
 
)
=
 
 
DS
N
=
 
(
 
 
 
)
:
 
 
 
 
In this deﬁnition, both
  and
  are circuits encoding probability distributions in the manner described
above.
DISJOINT SUPPORT is a restriction of STATISTICAL DIFFERENCE (SD), the complete problem for statisti-
cal zero knowledge given in [SV97]. The interactive proof system for DS we consider is given in Protocol 5.
It is a restriction of the proof system for SD, which in turn is based on ideas from the proof systems for
QUADRATIC NONRESIDUOSITY [GMR89] and GRAPH NONISOMORPHISM [GMW91].
Protocol 5: Proof system
(
 
 
 
) for DISJOINT SUPPORT
Input: Circuits
 
0 and
 
1 (each with
  input gates and
  output gates)
1.
  : Select
 
 
 
0
 
1
 . Obtain a sample
 
 
 
b (by choosing
 
 
 
0
 
1
 
m and letting
 
=
 
b
(
 
)). Send
  to
 .
2.
 : If
 
 
S
u
p
p
(
 
1
), let

=
1. Else let

=
0. Send
 to
  .
3.
  : If

=
 , accept. Otherwise, reject.
In order to understand what it means to apply a black box transformation to this protocol, we must
determine what power oracle access to the veriﬁer strategy and prover strategy gives. For a ﬁxed input
(
 
0
 
 
1
), the veriﬁer strategy has two components:
1. A function that takes the veriﬁer’s random coins
(
 
 
 
) and outputs
 
b
(
 
).
2. A function that takes the veriﬁer’s random coins
(
 
 
 
) and a prover message
, and outputs accept
or reject according to whether
 
=
.
4Clearly, the second function provides no power as an oracle, since it is just an equality test. Having oracle
access to the ﬁrst function is equivalent to having oracle access to each circuit
 
0 and
 
1 individually.
The prover strategy is simply a membership oracle for
S
u
p
p
(
 
1
); that is the oracle returns 1 on input
  iff
 
 
S
u
p
p
(
 
1
).
Motivation. Suppose this proof system could be converted to a public-coin one via a black-box transfor-
mation. Thismeansthat there arepolynomial-time algorithms
  and
 , such that
(
 
X
0
;
X
1
;
S
u
p
p
(
X
1
)
 
 
X
0
;
X
1
)
gives a public-coin proof system for DISJOINT SUPPORT. Recall that
  and
  are not given
 
0 and
 
1
explicitly as input, though they may run in time polynomial in the size of the input
 
(
 
0
 
 
1
)
 .
For intuition as to why such an
  and
  cannot exist, let us suppose that
 
0 and
 
1 can be arbitrary
one-to-one mappings from
 
0
 
1
 
k to
 
0
 
1
 
3
k (such that either
 
0
 
 
1 or
S
u
p
p
(
 
0
)
 
S
u
p
p
(
 
1
)
=
 )
and that
  and
  are only given running time polynomial in
 . In other words, we are no longer requiring
that
 
0 and
 
1 are given by small circuits. In fact, let us suppose that
 
0 and
 
1 are selected uniformly at
random among all mappings satisfying the stated conditions.
First, weargue that if
  never queries the oracle for
S
u
p
p
(
 
1
), then wearedone. If
  never queries the
oracle for
S
u
p
p
(
 
1
), then the interaction between
  and
  can be simulated by a probabilistic polynomial-
time algorithm
  just given oracle access to
 
0 and
 
1. By completeness and soundness, such a
  can
determine whether
 
0
 
 
1 or
S
u
p
p
(
 
0
)
 
S
u
p
p
(
 
1
)
=
 , just given oracle access to
 
0 and
 
1. We
claim this is impossible. This is because
 ’s view will be statistically independent of whether it is given
a YES or NO instance; in both cases,
  will simply see distinct, (almost) uniformly distributed elements of
 
0
 
1
 
3
k at each point it queries
 
0 and
 
1.
Therefore, it sufﬁces to show that
 ’s oracle access to
S
u
p
p
(
 
1
) is “useless” in the sense that we can
remove
 ’s queries to
S
u
p
p
(
 
1
) without affecting the completeness or soundness of the proof system.
Here is where we exploit the fact that the proof system is public coin. Consider the ﬁrst query
  that
 
makes to
S
u
p
p
(
 
1
). If
  has previously obtained
  by evaluating
 
1 at some point, then the response of
the oracle will certainly be
1, so it need not ask the query. We claim that, with high probability over the
choice of a random YES instance,
  cannot generate any other queries that lie in
S
u
p
p
(
 
1
). Intuitively,
this is because the points at which it has queried
 
1 give
  essentially no information about other points
in
S
u
p
p
(
 
1
), and
 
0 is essentially independent of
 
1 (since two independently selected mappings from
 
0
 
1
 
n
 
 
0
 
1
 
3
n will have disjoint ranges with high probability). Note that
  does not provide
  with
any assistance in generating a useful query, since
  only sends
  random coin ﬂips. We conclude that we
can remove
 ’s queries to
S
u
p
p
(
 
1
) only slightly reducing the probability that
  accepts on a random
YES instance. So, completeness is preserved on almost all YES instances, and soundness is preserved since
we have not modiﬁed
 . This yields a contradiction.
The main lemma. While for motivation above, we allowed
 
0 and
 
1 to have much higher complexity
than the algorithms
  and
 , we want to prove that a black-box transformation must fail even if
  and
  are given running time polynomial in the circuit sizes of
 
0 and
 
1. We will show how to construct
efﬁcient, pseudorandom versions of the mappings
 
0 and
 
1 used above, and these will sufﬁce to complete
the proof. The following lemma states the properties that are needed to prove our main theorem.
Lemma 6 If one-way functions exist, then there are ensembles of distributions
 
 
k
Y
 
k
2
N and
 
 
k
N
 
n
2
N on
pairs of circuits such that:
1.
 
k
Y and
 
k
N only produce pairs
(
 
0
 
 
1
) such that
 
0 and
 
1 both map
 
0
 
1
 
k to
 
0
 
1
 
3
k and both
are circuits of size at most
p
o
l
y
(
 
).
2.
P
r
￿
 
k
N
  DS
N
￿
=
1 and
P
r
￿
 
k
Y
  DS
Y
￿
 
1
 
2
￿
k.
53. For every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm
 , there is a negligible2 function
  such that
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
P
r
(
X
0
;
X
1
)
 
D
 
 
h
 
X
0
;
X
1
(
1
k
)
=
1
i
 
P
r
(
X
0
;
X
1
)
 
D
 
 
h
 
X
0
;
X
1
(
1
k
)
=
1
i
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
 
 
(
 
)
 
4. For every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm
 , the probability that
  succeeds in the follow-
ing experiment is bounded by negligible function of
 :
(a) Select
(
 
0
 
 
1
)
 
 
k
Y .
(b) Run
 
X
0
;
X
1
(
1
k
) to obtain output
 .
(c)
  succeeds if
 
 
S
u
p
p
(
 
1
) and
  did not obtain
  as a response to a query to the
 
1-oracle.
We defer the proof of this lemma to the next section and proceed with the proof of Theorem 1. The
proof essentially follows the motivation given above.
Proof of Theorem 1: Suppose the theorem is false. Then there are polynomial-time algorithms
  and
 
such that
(
 
X
0
;
X
1
;
S
u
p
p
(
X
1
)
 
 
X
0
;
X
1
) gives a public-coin proof system for DISJOINT SUPPORT. Recall that
  and
  are not given
 
0 and
 
1 explicitly as input, though they may run in time polynomial in the size
of the input
 
(
 
0
 
 
1
)
 .
We may assume that the completeness and soundness errors are at most
1
 
3. In particular, the probabil-
ity that
  accepts in the following experiment is at least
2
 
3:
Experiment I
1. Select
(
 
0
 
 
1
)
 
 
k
Y .
2. Run the interactive protocol between
 
X
0
;
X
1
;
S
u
p
p
(
X
1
)
(
1
k
) and
 
X
0
;
X
1
(
1
k
), at the end of which
 
accepts or rejects.
We will show that there is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm
 
2 such that if
 
X
0
;
X
1
;
S
u
p
p
(
X
1
) is
replaced by
 
X
0
;
X
1
2 in the above experiment,
  will still accept with probability at least
2
 
3
 
n
e
g
(
 
).
 
2 is deﬁned as follows:
 
X
0
;
X
1
2 simply simulates
 
X
0
;
X
1
;
S
u
p
p
(
X
1
) until
  tries to ask a query
  to the
S
u
p
p
(
 
1
)-oracle. If
  was previously obtained as a response to a query to the
 
1-oracle,
 
2 feeds
  the
response
1, otherwise it gives the response
0.
To show that
  still accepts with probability
2
 
3
 
n
e
g
(
 
) when
 
2 is used, it sufﬁces to show that
 
2 answers all of
 ’s queries correctly with all but negligible probability. If this weren’t the case, then
the following algorithm
 
3 would violate Property 4 in Lemma 6:
 
X
0
;
X
1
3 ﬁrst chooses
  uniformly from
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
(
 
)
 , where
 
(
 
) is polynomial bound on the number of queries
  makes to the
S
u
p
p
(
 
1
)-oracle.
Then
 
3 proceeds exactly as
 
2 until
  makes its
 ’th query
  to the
S
u
p
p
(
 
1
)-oracle, at which point
 
3
halts and outputs
 . Now, whenever
 
2 would answer some query incorrectly,
 
3 succeeds if it chooses
 
corresponding to the ﬁrst incorrect response, which happens with probability
1
 
 
(
 
).
Therefore, replacing
 
X
0
;
X
1
;
S
u
p
p
(
X
1
) with
 
X
0
;
X
1
2 will decrease
 ’s acceptance probability in Exper-
iment I by at most a negligible amount. Now consider the probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm
  which,
when given oracle access to
 
0 and
 
1, simulates the interaction between
 
X
0
;
X
1
2 and
 
X
0
;
X
1 and outputs
1 iff
  accepts. When given
(
 
0
 
 
1
)
  DS
Y ,
  will output 1 with probability at least
2
 
3
 
n
e
g
(
 
) by
what we have just shown. When given
(
 
0
 
 
1
)
  DS
N,
  will output 1 with probability at most
1
 
3, by
the soundness of
 
X
0
;
X
1. This contradicts Property 3 of Lemma 6.
2A function
￿
 
N
!
 
 
;
 
℄ is negligible if for every polynomial
p
 
N
!
N,
￿
 
n
 
<
 
=
p
 
n
  for sufﬁciently large
n.
6The above proof highlights the difﬁculty faced by a prover in a public-coin proof system. It is more
difﬁcult for the prover to make “useful” queries to an oracle, since it must essentially generate the queries
on its own; the veriﬁer only provides random coin ﬂips.
3 Proof of Lemma 6
The construction of circuits we need is based on pseudorandom permutations [LR88].
Deﬁnition 7 Let
 
=
S
k
 
k, where
 
k is a set of permutations
 
s
:
 
0
 
1
 
k
 
 
0
 
1
 
k indexed by seeds
 
 
 
0
 
1
 
k

(for some constant

 
0).
  is said to be a family of strong pseudorandom permutations if the
following properties hold:
1. Given
 
 
 
0
 
1
 
k

and
 
 
 
0
 
1
 
k,
 
s
(
 
) and
 
￿
1
s
(
 
) can be evaluated in time
p
o
l
y
(
 
).
2. For every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm
 , there is a negligible function
  such that
￿
￿
￿
￿
P
r
s
 
f
0
;
1
g
 

h
 
￿
 
;
￿
￿
1
 
(
1
k
)
=
1
i
 
P
r
￿
 
G
 
 
 
h
 
￿
;
￿
￿
1
(
1
k
)
=
1
i
￿
￿
￿
￿
 
 
(
 
)
 
where
 
k
;
k denotes the set of all permutations on
 
0
 
1
 
k.
Luby and Rackoff [LR88] showed how to construct a pseudorandom permutation family based on any
pseudorandom function family, which in turn can be constructed from any one-way function [GGM86,
HILL99]. Simpliﬁed constructions and analyses of pseudorandom permutations can be found in [NR97].
Theorem 8 ([LR88, GGM86, HILL99]) If there exist one-way functions, then there exist pseudorandom
permutation families.
From pseudorandom permutation families, it is easy to construct pseudorandom one-to-one functions.
Lemma 9 Assume one-way functions exist. Then there is a family of functions
 
=
S
k
 
k, where
 
k is
a set of one-to-one functions
 
s
:
 
0
 
1
 
k
 
 
0
 
1
 
3
k indexed by seeds
 
 
 
0
 
1
 
k

(for some constant

 
0), with the following properties:
1. Given
  and
 
 
 
0
 
1
 
k,
 
s
(
 
) can be evaluated in time
p
o
l
y
(
 
).
2. For every
 
 
 
0
 
1
 
k,
 
s
(
 
) is distributed uniformly in
 
0
 
1
 
3
k (over the choice
 
 
 
0
 
1
 
k

).
3. For every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm
 , there is a negligible function
  such that
￿
￿
￿
￿
P
r
s
 
f
0
;
1
g
 

h
 
f
 
(
1
k
)
=
1
i
 
P
r
f
 
G
 
 
3
 
h
 
f
(
1
k
)
=
1
i
￿
￿
￿
￿
 
 
(
 
)
 
where
 
k
;
3
k denotes the set of all one-to-one functions from
 
0
 
1
 
k to
 
0
 
1
 
3
k.
4. For every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm
 , the probability that
  succeeds in the following
experiment is bounded by a negligible function of
 :
(a) Choose
 
 
 
0
 
1
 
k

.
(b) Execute
 
f
 
(
1
k
) to obtain output
 .
7(c)
  succeeds if
  is in the range of
 
s and
  did not obtain
  as a response to a query to the
 
s-oracle.
Proof: By Theorem 8, there is a strong pseudorandom permutation family
 
=
S
 
k. We obtain our
function family
 
=
S
 
k as follows: A function in
 
s
;
y
 
 
k is indexed by a permutation
 
s
 
 
3
k and a
string
 
 
 
0
 
1
 
3
k, and isdeﬁned by
 
s
;
y
(
 
)
=
 
s
(
 
Æ
0
2
k
)
 
 .
 
s
;
y isone-to-one because
  isapermutation.
 
s
;
y
(
 
) varies uniformly over
 
0
 
1
 
3
k just over the choice of
 , so Property 2 holds. Properties 1 and 3
are straightforward to verify from the properties of pseudorandom permutations. Property 4 also follows
from the deﬁnition of strong pseudorandom permutations: It is easy to see that
  would succeed with
negligible probability if
  were constructed using atruly random permutation
  instead ofthe pseudorandom
permutation
 
s, even if
 is also given the random translation
 . Since the success of
 can be checked using
oracle access to
 
￿
1 (together with
 ), it can be used to build a distinguisher for the strong pseudorandom
permutation family
 .
We now prove Lemma 6.
Proof of Lemma 6: Let
 
=
S
 
k be a family of strong pseudorandom permutations and let
 
=
S
 
k
be the family of functions guaranteed by Lemma 9. The distributions
 
k
Y and
 
k
N are deﬁned as follows:
 
k
Y : Select
 
0 and
 
1 independently from
 
k. Let
 
0 and
 
1 be the circuits evaluating these functions.
Output
(
 
0
 
 
1
).
 
k
N: Select
  randomly from
 
k and
  randomly from
 . Let
 
0 be the circuit evaluating
 , and let
 
1 be
the circuit evaluating
 
Æ
 . Output
(
 
0
 
 
1
).
We now prove that all the properties required by Lemma 6 hold. The circuit sizes of
 
0 and
 
1 are
bounded by
p
o
l
y
(
 
) by the efﬁciency of
  and
 , so Property 1 holds. For Property 2, note that
  and
 
Æ
  both induce the uniform distribution on the range of
 , so
 
k
N always produces NO instances. To
see that
 
k
Y almost always produces YES instances, note that for every
 
 
 
 
 
0
 
1
 
k, the probability that
 
0
(
 
)
=
 
1
(
 
) is
2
￿
3
k (by Lemma 9, Item 2). Hence, the probability that the range of
 
0 and
 
1 intersect is
at most
(
2
k
)
2
 
2
￿
3
k
=
2
￿
k and Property 2 holds. For the indistinguishability of
 
k
Y and
 
k
N (Property 3),
observe that a polynomial-time algorithm would have only exponentially small advantage in distinguishing
the two distributions if all the functions used (
 
0,
 
1,
 , and
 ) to construct
 
0 and
 
1 were truly random
one-to-one functions. The indistinguishability then follows from the pseudorandomness of the families
 
and
 . Finally, Property 4 follows immediately from Lemma 9, Item 4.
4 Extensions
As mentioned in the introduction, the proof system for DISJOINT SUPPORT on which our construction is
based isactually honest-veriﬁer perfect zero knowledge. Bydeﬁnition, thismeans that there is aprobabilistic
polynomial-time simulator which, when fed a YES instance
 , produces an output distribution which is
identical to the veriﬁer’s view of the interaction with the prover on input
 . (The veriﬁer’s view is a random
variable
(
 
;
 
) consisting of a transcript
  of all the messages exchanged together with the veriﬁer’s random
coins
 .) Such a simulator for Protocol 5 is given by Algorithm 10.
8Algorithm 10: Simulator for DISJOINT SUPPORT proof system
Input: Circuits
 
0 and
 
1 (each with
  input gates and
  output gates)
1. Select
 
 
 
0
 
1
 . Choose
 
 
 
0
 
1
 
m and let
 
=
 
b
(
 
).
2. Let

=
 .
3. Output
(
 
 

;
 
 
 
)
It is immediate to verify that, on YES instances of DS, this simulator’s output distribution is identical to
the
  ’s view of Protocol 5. Now, a transformation from honest-veriﬁer perfect zero-knowledge proofs to
public-coin proofs, such as the one given by Okamoto [Oka96], might also make use of black-box access to
the simulator. But, for this proof system, black-box access to the simulator is equivalent to black-box access
to the veriﬁer. Fora ﬁxed input
(
 
0
 
 
1
), the simulator simply takes a pair
(
 
 
 
) and outputs
(
 
b
(
 
)
 
 
;
 
 
 
).
As was the case with the veriﬁer, having oracle access to this function is equivalent to having oracle access to
 
0 and
 
1 individually. Therefore, having oracle access to the simulator does not help in giving a black-box
transformation. This establishes Theorem 2.
A second observation about our construction is that the assumption that one-way functions exist is
unnecessary if we only want to rule out strong black-box transformations. Recall that a strong black-box
transformation of interactive proofs is one that works regardless of the computational complexity of the
veriﬁer’s strategy; the Goldwasser–Sipser transformation [GS89] is an example of such a transformation.
In such a case, the input
  is irrelevant, except that it bounds the number of random coins used by the two
parties and the total amount of communication between them to be a polynomial in
 
 
 . To show that there
do not exist strong black-box transformations from private coins to public coins that preserve the prover’s
complexity, it sufﬁces to have an analogue of Lemma 6 in which the condition on the sizes of the circuits
 
0
and
 
1 is removed (though their input and output lengths should remain
  and
3
 , respectively). Such an
analogue can be proven unconditionally using truly random permutations and one-to-one functions rather
than pseudorandom ones.
5 Perfect completeness
Recall that an interactive proof is said to have perfect completeness if the veriﬁer accepts with probability
1 on YES instances. In this section, we discuss black-box transformations from interactive proofs to ones
with perfect completeness. F¨ urer, Goldreich, Mansour, Sipser, and Zachos [FGM
+89] have given such a
transformation, in fact a strong black-box transformation, but it does not preserve the prover’s complex-
ity. Below, we explain why there can be no strong black-box transformation that preserves the prover’s
complexity (Proposition 3).
Lemma 11 Suppose there is a black-box transformation from interactive proofs to ones with perfect com-
pleteness that preserves the prover’s complexity. Then, for any interactive proof system
(
 
 
 
) for any
problem
￿, there is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm
  such that:
1.
 
 
￿
Y
 
P
r
￿
 
P
 
;
V
 
(
1
j
x
j
)
￿
=
1.
2.
 
 
￿
N
 
P
r
￿
 
P
 
;
V
 
(
1
j
x
j
)
￿
 
1
 
2.
9Above,
 
x and
 
x denote the strategies of
  and
  on input
 . If the transformation is a strong black-box
transformation, then the same conditions hold even if
  is allowed to be computationally unbounded.
Proof:
  simulates the transformed proof system
(
 
0
 
 
0
) on input
  and outputs 1 if
 
0 accepts.
A subclass of interactive proofs are ones in which the veriﬁer never interacts with the prover — these
are equivalent to
 
 
  algorithms. In such a case
 
x is useless, so Lemma 11 says that
 
V
  can decide
￿
with one-sided error. Since
  is polynomial time, this implies that
￿
 

 -
 
 . Thus, we conclude that
 
 
 
 

 -
 
 . Since
 
 
  is closed under complement, we have:
Proposition 12 If there is a black-box transformation from interactive proofs to ones with perfect complet-
ness that preserves the prover’s complexity, then
 
 
 
=
 
 
 .
What does this reasoning give for strong black-box transformations? In this case, the veriﬁer strategy
 
x can be an arbitrary function from the space of its random coin tosses (say
 
0
 
1
 
m) to
 
 


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 
which either accepts at least 2/3 of its inputs or rejects at least 2/3 of its inputs. Lemma 11 says that a prob-
abilistic
p
o
l
y
(
 
)-time algorithm can distinguish between these two cases with one-sided error, given only
oracle access to
 
x. This is impossible if there are no restrictions placed on
 
x. This proves Proposition 3.
This provides an explanation for why the transformation of F¨ urer et al. does not preserve the prover’s
complexity, but we used the restriction to strong black-box transformations in an essential way. The con-
clusion for non-strong black-box transformations (
 
 
 
=
 
 
 ) was much weaker, in fact quite plau-
sible. This is not an accident. Under plausible intractability assumptions, a series of works (beginning
with [NW94] and culminating in [IW97]) have constructed pseudorandom generators
 
:
 
0
 
1
 
O
(
l
o
g
m
)
 
 
0
 
1
 
m whose output looks pseudorandom to any algorithm running in time, say,
 
2. Such a pseudorandom
generator can be used to give a black-box derandomization of any
 
 
  algorithm by running the algorithm
on all possible outputs of the generator. The resulting algorithm is deterministic, so has not only one-sided
error, but zero error. Under stronger (but still plausible) assumptions, analogous pseudorandom generators
can be made for constant-round public-coin interactive proof systems [AK97, KvM99, BV99]. These gen-
erators can be used to derandomize such a proof system by replacing the veriﬁer’s messages (which consists
of random coin ﬂips) with all possible outputs of the generator. This preserves the prover’s complexity
and the result is a deterministic proof system (i.e., an
 
  proof system), so it certainly has perfect com-
pleteness. While these results do not cover all interactive proof systems, they suggest that there may very
well be a black-box transformation from interactive proofs to ones with perfect completeness that preserves
the prover’s complexity. Proposition 12 shows that the existence of such a transformation is closely tied
to issues in derandomization; at a minimum it would imply
 
 
 
=
 
 
 . As we currently only know
how to obtain the latter conclusion under intractability assumptions, we would also expect the black-box
transformation to rely on such an assumption.
6 Conclusion
This main result of this paper demonstrates that, under standard assumptions, current techniques are in-
sufﬁcient to convert private-coin interactive proofs into public-coin interactive proofs while preserving the
complexity of the prover. It would be interesting to give a more absolute separation, showing that it is strictly
easier to prove some statements to a private-coin veriﬁer than to a public-coin veriﬁer. That is, construct
a problem
￿ with a private-coin interactive proof
(
 
 
 
) such that
￿ has no public-coin interactive proof
where the prover can be implemented in polynomial time with oracle access to
 . Presumably such a result
would be under an intractability assumption. Bellare and Goldwasser [BG94] have given results of this na-
ture for a different issue, namely separating the power needed to decide a language from the power needed
to prove membership.
10While we have considered the problems of converting interactive proofs to ones with public coins or per-
fect completeness, there are several other general transformations of interactive proofs lacking one or more
desirable properties. For example, the transformation from general interactive proofs to zero-knowledge
proofs [BGG
+88] does not preserve the prover’s complexity. Another example is the Collapse Theorem
of Babai and Moran [BM88], which does preserve the prover’s complexity, but does not preserve any sort
of zero knowledge property. Both of these transformations are black-box transformations, and it would be
interesting to determine if this makes their deﬁciencies necessary.
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